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THE SUPREME COURT IN THE LYON'S DEN:
A FAILURE OF JUDICIAL PROCESS*
Bernard Wolfman t
On average, the Supreme Court has heard fewer than four civil
tax cases a year in the last decade.' Its decision to consider a tax case
represents a commitment of scarce and valuable resources to the
resolution of issues of statutory construction that are usually difficult,
intricate, and important. Hardly an enclave of tax experts, the Su-
preme Court relies for illumination and protection on the validity of a
basic assumption of the adversary process: that strong and effective
advocates bring the issues into focus and marshal the strongest argu-
ments for each side, thus educating the Court and helping it reach the
best result. And the stakes are high, for each case not only affects the
immediate fortunes of the litigating taxpayer and the Treasury, but it
also has potentially widespread repercussions as lawyers structure
future transactions with the new judicial guideposts in mind.2
Frank Lyon Co. v. United States,' the Court's most recent attempt to
deal with the problem of allocating depreciation deductions in real
estate financing transactions, illustrates the point. In the three years
since the case was decided, it has had a pervasive impact on real estate
arrangements. Lawyers now tailor transactions to take advantage of
the tax sheltering opportunities created by the Frank Lyon opinion. But
the example of Frank Lyon does not reflect well on the Court or the
adversary process. The Court's decision and opinion manifest an
understanding that is questionable at best. The poor outcome, dis-
* This Article is based on the Irvine Lecture delivered by the author in November 1980 at
Cornell Law School.
t Fessenden Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. A.B. 1946, J.D. 1948, University of
Pennsylvania. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance provided him by
Howard E. Abrams and Kathleen M. Smalley while students at Harvard Law School.
1 The Supreme Court, 1970 Term through 1979 Term, 85-94 HARV. L. REV., November,
Table III. See also B. WOLFMAN, J. SILVER, & M. SILVER, DISSENT WITHOUT OPINION, THE
BEHAVIOR OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS IN FEDERAL TAX CASES 141-66 (1975) (earlier
version at 122 U. PA. L. REV. 235, 331-56 (1973)).
2 Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 580 (1978) ("We cannot ignore the
reality that the tax laws affect the shape of nearly every business transaction."); Commissioner
v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 579-80 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[T]he tax laws exist as an
economic reality in the businessman's world, much like the existence of a competitor. Business-
men plan their affairs around both, and a tax dollar is just as real as one derived from any other
source.").
3 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
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turbing as it is, may nevertheless be the least objectionable aspect of
the case, for even the best of process will occasionally produce a flawed
opinion and a wrong result. It would be comforting to think of Frank
Lyon as such an aberration, but the story of this case casts some doubt
on the adversary system itself as a reliable vehicle for attaining justice
in tax disputes and for producing sound and authoritative interpreta-
tion of the Internal Revenue Code. The weakness of government
counsel was no match for the strength of taxpayer counsel who moved
the Court to consider a tax case in which the grant of certiorari was
misguided 4 and to decide it on the basis of a misperception of some of
the facts.5 The tale of Frank Lyon is one of process gone awry. If it
comes to typify dispute resolution in the Supreme Court, it will be
necessary for us to give serious reconsideration to the process itself as
well as its assumptions.
I
THE TRANSACTION
Frank Lyon involved a fairly mundane financing transaction.
Worthen, a bank in Little Rock, planned a new office building to
replace its existing structure. Because a local competitor was in the
process of constructing a new office building at about the same time,
early completion of the Worthen building became important as the
two banks competed for tenants and prestige.6 Initially, Worthen
planned to build and finance the new structure and to retain title
itself, but state and federal banking regulators required that Worthen
neither borrow the building funds directly nor carry the bank prem-
ises, subject to a long-term mortgage, as a balance sheet asset. 7 Conse-
4 See text accompanying notes 97-104 infra.
5 See text accompanying notes 95-96, 105-23 infra.
6 This account is detailed in order to convey the full flavor of the transaction; many of the
details were important to the Court in its disposition of the case. See text accompanying notes
61-77 infra.
7 Worthen was a state-chartered bank, subject to regulation by both the Arkansas State
Bank Commissioner and the Federal Reserve Board. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 321-339 (1976);
Appendix to the Record, vol. 1, at 131, Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978)
(testimony of Edward Penick, chairman and chief executive officer of Worthen) [hereinafter
referred to as Appendix; all subsequent references to briefs, records, and transcripts refer to the
Lyon case]. During the construction of the building, Worthen became a national bank. 435
U.S. at 564 n.1.
The Arkansas usury law imposed a six percent ceiling on interest rates; Worthen could not
effectively market debentures at such a low rate. In addition, Worthen's investment in bank
premises could not exceed the amount of its capital stock without Federal Reserve Board
1076 [Vol. 66:1075
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quently, Worthen developed a plan under which it would select an
"investor" for whom it would negotiate the construction contract and
arrange for permanent financing. This investor would take title to the
building and lease it to Worthen for a twenty-five year term, with
Worthen having an option to acquire title8 or to extend the lease.
Worthen would acquire and own the land, parking deck, and lease-
hold improvements. The regulators approved this plan.'
Worthen accordingly acquired the site and, because of the race
for completion, commenced construction of the building before select-
ing an investor.10 Worthen was the initial owner of the building
because, as a national bank, it could purchase construction materials
free of state sales tax.1 The sale of the building to the investor, brick
by brick, would be a sale of real estate, not subject to sales tax. 2
As construction began, Worthen searched for a suitable
third-party investor. The Frank Lyon Company, like Eastman Dil-
lon, Union Securities & Company, Goldman, Sachs & Company, and
Stephens, Incorporated, submitted a proposal. 13  Several of the
would-be investors suggested that Worthen retain ownership of the
land in order to simplify calculation of option prices. Worthen ac-
cepted this suggestion, integrated the most favorable terms from each
proposal into a new counterproposal, and offered it to several of the
bidders. One of these was the Frank Lyon Company, a distributor of
household electronic products and a Worthen customer whose major
shareholder sat on Worthen's board of directors, and which had
employed common counsel with the bank. 14 Because Lyon had accu-
approval, and Worthen was told that this approval would not be granted. Appendix, supra, vol.
1, at 301-02 (unreported district court opinion, finding of fact).
8 The repurchase option was required by the Federal Reserve Board. Appendix, supra
note 7, vol. 2, at 326 (letter from Federal Reserve Bank to Worthen).
9 Appendix, supra note 7, vol. 2, at 326-27 (letter from Federal Reserve Bank to
Worthen), 336-37 (letter from Arkansas State Bank Department to Worthen).
10 Appendix, supra note 7, vol. 1, at 302 (unreported district court opinion, finding of fact).
1 This peculiar form of the transaction can be explained by Worthen's having become a
national bank by the time construction began. As such, it was exempt from Arkansas sales tax
on its purchases. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-1904(1) (1960); see First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. Tax
Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339 (1968). The sale from Worthen to Lyon qualified for the real estate
exemption from the Arkansas sales tax. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-1902(c) (Supp. 1979).
12 Absent the quirk in state law, the investor would have contracted for construction and
simply leased the building to Worthen, the landowner.
13 See Appendix, supra note 7, vol. 2, at 346-47 (Lyon proposal), 601-08 (Eastman Dillon
proposal), 340-43 (Goldman, Sachs proposal), 344-45 (Stephens proposal).
14 Both Lyon and Worthen had been represented by the law firm of Rose, Nash, William-
son, Carroll, Clay & Giroir until the instant transaction was negotiated. J. Gaston Williamson,
a senior partner in the firm, remained as counsel to Frank Lyon Company throughout the
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mulated earnings to such an extent that it needed to diversify in order
to avoid the imposition of a penalty tax under section 531 of the
Internal Revenue Code, it was particularly interested in the Worthen
proposal. When Lyon not only accepted the counterproposal but
bettered it by offering Worthen a $21,000 annual reduction in the rent
during the first five years of the lease, Worthen selected Lyon to serve
as the third-party investor.15
Under Worthen's counterproposal, the investor was to use the
rent during the initial lease term of twenty-five years to repay New
York Life Insurance Company's $7,140,000 mortgage loan. The
quarterly rent charged Worthen was set at precisely the amount
necessary to make the quarterly payments to retire the New York Life
obligation. Lyon thus was to have a zero cash flow during the entire
primary term of the lease. Because the building was expected to cost
$7,640,000, Worthen required Lyon to supply an equity of $500,000.
Worthen was given the right to repurchase the building after eleven,
fifteen, twenty, and twenty-five years; the repurchase prices were set
exactly at the then outstanding New York Life debt, plus the inves-
tor's $500,000 with six percent interest compounded annually from
the date of the investment.1" Worthen was also responsible for all
taxes and other building-related expenses, and the agreements allo-
cated to Worthen the investment tax credit.' 7 In the event of con-
demnation or destruction before December 1, 1980, proceeds in
excess of the amount due on the New York Life mortgage and Lyon's
$500,000 would go to Lyon; after that date, the excess would be
Worthen's. 18
Worthen was given the right to extend the lease eight times, each
for a five year term, at an annual rent of $300,000. This rent,
however, would be offset by a land rent that Lyon would owe
transaction and during the tax litigation. He also continued to serve as a member of Worthen's
board of directors along with Frank Lyon. See Letter from Bernard Wolfman to Erwin N.
Griswold (May 2, 1977) (on file at Cornell Law Review); MooDy's BANK & FINANCE MANUAL
(1968-1975).
15 See Appendix, supra note 7, vol. 2, at 349-51 (Worthen's specification), 352-54 (Lyon's
acceptance); id., vol. 1, at 108 (testimony of Lyon's vice-president).
16 435 U.S. at 565-68.
17 Id. at 572 n. 11. It is freely allocable between lessor and lessee. The credit is therefore not
linked to the taxpayer's status as owner (or investor) as depreciation deductions are. See note 79
and accompanying text infra.
11 This statement accepts the taxpayer's assertion. See 435 U.S. at 571 n.7. The Eighth
Circuit's opinion states that the excess went to Worthen in all events. Frank Lyon Co. v.
United States, 536 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1976). See also Letter from Lyon's trial counsel, J.
Gaston Williamson, to Bernard Wolfman (July 6, 1978) (on file at Cornell Law Review).
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Worthen. For the first option period, the land rent totaled $500,000,
and it increased by $50,000 with each extension until it reached a
maximum of $250,000 per year. In short, Worthen's net obligation
during the renewal periods would start at $200,000 annually, and
would drop to $50,000 for the last period."9 In the aggregate, these
rents would approach, although they would not yield precisely, the
amount of Lyon's investment plus interest.20
Lyon's lease of the land from Worthen ran unconditionally for
seventy-five years from the construction of the building,2 1 and, for the
last ten years of this term, the rent would be $10,000 per year.
Worthen had no contractual right to occupy the building during this
period. The potential renegotiation of the lease or use of the building
in some alternative enterprise presented Lyon with the possibility,
sixty-five to seventy-five years hence, of recouping the balance of its
$500,000 investment, or perhaps something more.22
Worthen added the land and parking deck to the security given to
New York Life and agreed to pay the annual rent without asserting
any set-off or counterclaim against Lyon. Lyon, in turn, assigned the
lease obligation to New York Life. Because the rental payments were
equal to the loan repayments, the assignment insured that New York
Life would be paid as long as Worthen remained solvent. Although
only Lyon was liable on the note, the agreements effectively made
Worthen primarily liable for repayment and placed Lyon in the role of
surety. 23
Despite the fact that Lyon's bid had been successful because of its
offer to accept $21,000 less rent for each of the first five years, the final
lease agreement did not provide for the rent reduction-this, because
New York Life, assignee of the lease, insisted that Worthen's obliga-
tion equal the mortgage debt to the penny.24 Worthen instead agreed
19 See Appendix, supra note 7, vol. 2, at 355 (rental schedule).
20 536 F.2d at 749; Brief for the United States at 14.
" The lease actually ran for 76 years and seven months, the extra 19 months representing
the estimated construction time. 435 U.S. at 565.
22 See id. at 579. Assuming a constant six percent annual rate of interest, the present value
of the right to receive $1 in 65 years is less than three cents; at 10%, it is less than one-half cent.
3 See 536 F.2d at 754. Justice Blackmun wrote that "[i]t may well be that the remedies
available to New York Life against Lyon would be far greater than any remedy available to it
against Worthen. . . ." 435 U.S. at 577 n. 13. Because Worthen had an absolute obligation to
pay the yearly rent throughout the 25 year period during which New York Life was to be
repaid, Appendix, supra note 7, vol. 2, at 380-81 (building lease), and because these rents were
assigned and the building, land, and parking deck were mortgaged to New York Life as
security for the loan, id. at 490-91, 495, the mortgage obligation lay primarily upon Worthen.
24 536 F.2d at 748 n.1.
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to pay the full amount of the original rent directly to New York Life,
while Lyon agreed to pay a compensating, higher-than-market inter-
est rate on an "unrelated" $500,000 bank loan. 25 Accordingly, Lyon
received no cash from its tenant.
The substance of the transaction can be summarized as follows:
(1) For the first twenty-five years, Worthen had the benefits
and burdens normally associated with ownership, but did not have
legal title;
(2) Worthen could repurchase the building after eleven~years
or more by paying the then outstanding portion of the mortgage
debt and the $500,000 "equity" plus interest. As a result,
Worthen, not Lyon, was entitled to the appreciation in the value of
the building that might result from market factors or inflation;
(3) Lyon bore the remote risk, to the extent of its $500,000
investment, that the building would depreciate so substantially that
Worthen would abandon its more than $7,000,000 investment by
not exercising either its option to purchase for $500,000 plus inter-
est at the end of twenty-five years or its options to renew the lease
after the initial twenty-five year term;26
(4) Worthen could extend the lease for up to forty years be-
yond the initial period on terms even more favorable than the
repurchase option;27
(5) For the first twenty-five years, Lyon would receive no cash
flow and no pre-tax gain from the transaction; and
(6) Lyon's legal title to the building could not be disturbed for
eleven years.
II
THE LITIGATION
Both the Frank Lyon Company and Worthen treated the transac-
tion on their tax returns just as they had characterized it in the
25 Id. Ironically, the record reveals that Lyon had not paid completely the additional
interest by the time of the trial because it would have resulted in a rate in excess of that
permitted under the Arkansas usury statute. Appendix, supra note 7, vol. 1, at 192-94. The
existence of this loan suggests a question never adequately considered in the tax litigation: Did
Lyon have anything at stake? In an "independent" transaction, it borrowed the full amount of
its "equity investment" from Worthen.
26 See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra. Apparently, Lyon never argued that Worthen
would not renew; it claimed only that the purchase option would never be exercised because
the renewal option was so favorable. See Appendix, supra note 7, vol. 1, at 170 (testimony of
Worthen officer).
" Appendix, supra note 7, vol. 1, at 170 (testimony of Worthen officer).
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documents. Worthen took rental deductions for the payments re-
quired under the lease; Lyon recognized ordinary income in the
amount of the rental payments, and it deducted the interest payments
made to New York Life. As nominal owner of the building, Lyon took
accelerated depreciation deductions on the building and its compo-
nents, based on useful lives of fifteen to forty years. Lyon's first
interest payments were made, and depreciation deductions claimed,
in December 1969.28 Lyon's 1969 return and Worthen's 1969 and
1970 returns were audited. 9 In both instances, the Internal Revenue
Service recharacterized the transaction. The government disallowed
Worthen's rental deduction but treated Worthen as the building's
owner, giving it deductions for interest and accelerated depreciation
based on a forty-five year composite life for the new facility.3" The
government also disallowed Lyon's interest and depreciation deduc-
tions while excluding from its income the rental it had accrued. Lyon
paid the income tax deficiency asserted against it and sued for refund
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkan-
sas.
Lyon urged that the transaction be characterized as the docu-
ments between the parties described it. It argued that the 'arrange-
ment was not motivated purely by a desire to avoid taxation.31 In-
deed, the government conceded that more than mere tax avoidance
was behind the form of the transaction, for Worthen had brought in a
third-party investor only after the banking regulators denied it per-
mission to finance the construction by direct dealing with the mortga-
gee.32 Because the expected tax consequences form a major part of
virtually all substantial business transactions, the taxpayer contended
that its expectations should not be disappointed "unless there is some
substantial reason based in tax policy" requiring it.33 Lyon asserted
28 Although only one-twelfth of a year's depreciation was involved in December 1969, and
only one month's interest owing to New York Life was accruable, December was the month in
which Lyon claimed the deduction for interest on the temporary construction loan that
Worthen had arranged, and this item alone totaled almost $404,000. See 75-2 U.S. Tax Gas.
9545 (E.D. Ark. 1975).
29 Letter from Lyon's trial counsel, J. Gaston Williamson, to Bernard Wolfman (May 20,
1977) (on file at Cornell Law Review).
30 Id.
31 Lyon acknowledged that "a party should not be allowed to use purely formal labels or
maneuvers to frustrate the intent of tax provisions" and that "economic decisions should not
be distorted by attempts to achieve tax benefits which present no economic benefit." Brief for
the Petitioner at 16. Lyon argued, however, that "the parties have substantial non-tax motives
for the transaction . . . ." Id. at 17.
32 See Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 11.
33 Brief for the Petitioner at 15. Because the government agreed that the transaction was
not tax-motivated in its entirety, see text accompanying notes 31 & 32 supra, Lyon was helped in
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that no such reason existed in this case. On the contrary, Lyon
contended, there was a strong reason not to upset its expectations
because private arrangements that may be fair given one set of tax
consequences may become completely unreasonable with a different
set; to permit the Internal Revenue Service to redetermine honestly
estimated tax consequences of a transaction is to render business more
precarious and expensive than otherwise.
The government maintained that the labels applied by the parties
should not control. 34 It urged that because the purchase option prices
were far below fair market value, Worthen would be economically
compelled to purchase the building.35 The government also asserted
that the agreements gave Lyon little more than bare legal title to the
building. No single aspect of the sale-leaseback would be fatal to
Lyon's claim for depreciation, but the government insisted that the
real benefits and burdens allocated to Lyon in the transaction, taken
as a group, simply were too insubstantial to warrant allocating to
Lyon the tax attributes that are associated with ownership. The gov-
ernment argued that the transaction should instead be viewed as the
construction of a building by Worthen, with a first mortgage loan in
the amount of $7,140,000 from New York Life, and a second mort-
gage loan in the amount of $500,000 from Lyon. Repayment of the
second mortgage would await exercise of the repurchase option.36
Lyon responded with testimony that the rents and purchase
prices were reasonable and reflected a fair estimate of expected future
values. Lyon also showed that Worthen would not be economically
compelled to repurchase the building, but only because the lease
renewal terms were so favorable that Worthen would do better to rent
than to buy.3 7 Finally, Lyon claimed that it bore the risk of deprecia-
tion, for if the building substantially declined in value, Worthen could
abandon the premises after twenty-five years, leaving Lyon as the
owner with an additional fifty years of liability on its ground lease.
Lyon denied that it was merely a conduit between Worthen and
New York Life, explaining the equality between rental payments and
distinguishing the familiar "form over substance" cases involving complex legal mechanics
animated solely by a desire to sidestep taxation. Brief for the Petitioner at 16. The government
quoted, ineffectually, from Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 286 (1960): "[T]he
parties' expectations or hopes as to the tax treatment of their conduct in themselves have
nothing to do with the matter." Brief for the United States at 27-28.
Brief for the United States at 26-27.
3 See Appendix, supra note 7, vol. 1, at 291-92,297-98, 308. Cf. Addendum infra, at 1101.
30 Brief for the United States at 30-32; cf. 435 U.S. at 584-88 (dissenting opinion ofJustice
Stevens).
17 Brief for the United States at 30-32; id. at 13 nn.12 & 20.
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loan repayments as ordinary business caution: All landlords use rental
proceeds to satisfy their construction loans, and Lyon had simply
assured itself that its rental income would be sufficient to meet its loan
obligations.3 8 As the sole party directly liable on the loan to New
York Life, Lyon insisted that it should be treated as owner.
39
The district court entered judgment for Lyon. 40 In holding that
the sale and leaseback were bona fide and that Lyon should be treated
as the owner of the Worthen Bank building, the court relied primarily
on the terminology used in the transaction documents, on the unwill-
ingness of the banking regulators to approve Worthen's acquisition of
the building in a form that would designate Worthen as owner-debtor,
on the "arm's length" negotiations between Worthen and Lyon,
41
and on the reasonableness of the purchase price and the rents. The
trial judge found that the parties intended a sale-leaseback with an
option to repurchase, and that this was the substance of the transac-
tion.
The government appealed to the Eighth Circuit. There Lyon
contended that the government was asking the appellate court to
reevaluate the district court's findings of fact, findings that should be
binding on an appellate court unless clearly erroneous. But the court,
in an opinion by Judge Bright, disagreed and reversed, treating the
issue as one of law, not fact. 42 Judge Bright observed that the intent
of the parties is relevant insofar as it may help to establish the state law
consequences of the parties' arrangements inter sese. He accepted the
government's view of property as a bundle of sticks, each stick repre-
senting "an interest in the underlying res which is the object of
property." 43  The intent of the parties was relevant in determining
which party possessed which sticks, but once the actual allocation of
the various interests was determined, it was for the court to determine
as a matter of federal law whether a given package of sticks was
sufficient to justify the allocation of the depreciation deduction. 44
The court proceeded to analyze the allocation of rights and obli-
gations assigned by the agreements to Worthen and Lyon, concluding
38 Brief for the Petitioner at 37 n.20.
'9 Brief for the Petitioner at 37-40; cf. 435 U.S. at 576 ("[I]t was Lyon alone. . . who was
liable on the notes . . ").
40 75-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 9545 (E.D. Ark. 1975), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 7, vol. 1,
at 301, 311, rev'd, 536 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
41 Appendix, supra note 7, vol. 1, at 302 (proposed finding of fact).
4' Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 561
(1978).
43 536 F.2d at 751.
44 Id. at 750.
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that Worthen had all the rights and responsibilities of ownership,
while Lyon had nothing but legal title and the claim to a tax shelter
provided by depreciation and interest deductions. As the Eighth Cir-
cuit saw the transaction, Worthen received the investment tax credit
45
and the deduction for sales tax on construction materials; 46 it bore
responsibility for maintenance and insurance; it received any proceeds
attributable to appreciation on destruction or condemnation; 47 its
purchase option price was calculated to pay off Lyon's investment
with six percent interest, and the rents during the extensions of the
initial lease term closely approximated this result. Thus, Worthen
would derive the benefit of any appreciation and would control the
ultimate disposition of the building through its options and its owner-
ship of the site.48 Lyon, on the other hand, appeared to the court as
nothing more than a conduit for payments from Worthen to New
York Life.49 Consequently, although the court was careful to note
that no single aspect of the transaction precluded a depreciation de-
duction for the mortgagor-lessor, "all of these features . . . employed
in the same transaction . . [have] the cumulative effect of depriving
the taxpayer of any significant ownership interest." 50  Given that
there is but one owner for tax purposes and that the depreciation
deduction accrues to it, Lyon was not the taxpayer entitled to that
deduction.
Lyon then added new counsel 5' and petitioned the Supreme
Court for certiorari, asserting that Judge Bright's opinion was "fun-
damentally in conflict" 5 2 with the approach of the Fourth Circuit in
American Realty Trust v. United States53 and the approach of the Ninth
Circuit in Cubic Corp. v. United States.54 The Court granted certiorari
because of "an indicated conflict" with American Realty Trust.55
45 See note 79 and accompanying text infra.
46 The Eighth Circuit apparently was mistaken on this count. Worthen purchased the
construction materials because, as a national bank, it was not subject to sales tax, and the sale
to Lyon of the building, as a sale of real estate, was not subject to sales tax. See note 11 supra.
47 But see text accompanying note 58 infra.
48 536 F.2d at 752-53.
49 Id. at 753-54.
o Id. at 754.
51 Lyon retained Erwin N. Griswold as "Counsel for the Petitioner" in the Supreme
Court. Mr. Griswold appeared as such on all documents filed with the Court, and he presented
the taxpayer's oral argument on the merits. J. Gaston Williamson, Lyon's counsel below,
served "Of Counsel" in the Supreme Court. Mr. Williamson continues to serve on Worthen's
board of directors, and he is counsel to both Worthen and Lyon generally.
52 Petition for Certiorari at 8-9.
53 498 F.2d 1194 (4th Cir. 1974).
m 541 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1976).
55 435 U.S. at 572.
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In a seven to two decision rendered by Justice Blackmun, the
Court reversed the Eighth Circuit.56 The majority perceived "super-
ficial appeal" 57 in the position of the government and the reasoning of
the Eighth Circuit because of the relationship of Lyon and its presi-
dent and principal shareholder with Worthen, the peculiarity of the
venture for Lyon, the identity of mortgage and rental payments, the
provisions relating to condemnation and destruction, the options, and
the tax benefits, 58 but it concluded that "Lyon has far the better of the
case." 59  In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on twenty-six
factors.60
The Court first distinguished prior sale-leaseback cases in which
depreciation had not followed nominal ownership. 61 Noting that
these cases (including its own decision in Lazarus)62 had involved only
two parties,6 3 the Court observed that the Worthen-Lyon-New York
Life transaction involved three, which "significantly distinguishes this
case." 
6 4
After disposing of these prior cases, the Court focused on the
Lyon transaction, finding important the fact that Lyon alone was
liable on the note to New York Life. That liability, the Court stated,
exposed Lyon's business to a "real and substantial risk." 65 In addi-
tion, if Worthen should fail to exercise its purchase option, Lyon
would not be guaranteed a six percent return; thus, the Court stated,
Lyon gambled that the rental value during the last ten years of the
ground lease would be sufficient, when added to the rent received
-'Justice White, dissenting, would have affirmed on the basis of the Eighth Circuit's
opinion. 435 U.S. at 584. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 584-88; see
text accompanying notes 85-88 infra.
5 435 U.S. at 581.
5 See id. at 581-82.
59 Id. at 583.
60 See id. at 582-83.
61 See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 944 (1978).
62 In Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939), a taxpayer-department store had
transferred title to its buildings to a bank as trustee for land-trust certificate holders. The
bank-trustee leased back the buildings to the department store for 99 years with an option to
renew. Arguing that the right to depreciation deductions followed legal title, the government
denied the deductions to the department store. The Court sustained the taxpayer, holding that
the transaction was in essence a mortgage loan. In Frank Lyon, the government argued, inter
alia, that the basis on which it lost in Lazarus required that it now prevail-that the depreciation
(and interest) deductions belong to the party financed (Worthen) and not to the financing party
(Frank Lyon).
63 435 U.S. at 575-76.
6 Id. at 576.
65 Id. at 577.
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during the renewal terms, to enable it to recoup its investment and
enjoy a reasonable return."' Because Lyon's capital was at stake, the
depreciation deduction was properly allocable to it. In support of this
conclusion, the Court echoed an argument offered by Lyon's new
Supreme Court counsel. The Worthen-Lyon-New York Life transac-
tion did not create any deductions; 7 on the contrary, the only ques-
tion was which of two taxpayers would be permitted to take them.68
Because Lyon asserted (unchallenged by the government) that both
taxpayers were subject to taxation at the same rates69 and that neither
was in a special tax circumstance, the Court perceived no real effect
on government revenue 7° and no reason to upset the expectations of
the taxpayers in the absence of such an effect.
Justice Blackmun then recited the twenty-six factors which, in the
view of the majority, established that the government's characteriza-
tion of Lyon as a lender did not accord with' economic reality. 71
Among them, in addition to those already noted, were the role of the
state and federal regulators in limiting Worthen's alternatives for
structuring the transaction, the competitive situation between the two
local banks, the competitive bidding among potential investors, and
the findings of the reasonableness of the option prices and renewal
rentals. 72
One of these factors deserves special comment. There was, in-
deed, competitive bidding among the potential investors. 73 But the
Court's opinion ignores just what it was the investors were bidding
for. Any appreciation accruing to the investor on the bank building
was at least sixty-five years away, because Worthen's repurchase
option and lease renewal options limited the investor to a six percent
return. The present value of such a distant return is negligible.7 4 The
would-be investors bid for something else. They sought to garner the
66 Id. at 579.
11 Id. at 580.
e8 Id. at 583.
69 Id.
71 Id. at 580. In this regard, Justice Blackmun found it reassuring that the transaction was
"nonfamily and nonprivate" in nature, suggesting that this aspect of the case implied that
Worthen and Lyon were not cooperating to decrease government revenue. Id. at 583. Surely it
only establishes that Worthen would demand some share of the tax savings in return for the
depreciation deductions and not give them away, and Worthen did indeed sell to the highest
bidder.
71 Id. at 582-83.
72 Id. at 583.
T' Appendix, supra note 7, vol. 1, at 302 (district court finding of fact).
T See note 22 supra.
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income tax benefits of ownership: the early interest and accelerated
depreciation deductions to shelter their high-bracket income from
other sources. Lyon estimated that these benefits would save it ap-
proximately $1.5 million in the first eleven years of ownership. 75 The
rental income would thereafter exceed the deduction for interest and
depreciation, resulting in taxable income that would eventually offset
the earlier tax losses. But the taxpayer would have enjoyed the bene-
fits of deferral, equivalent to an interest-free loan in the amount of the
tax deferred, often equivalent to a tax-free return on actual invest-
ment.76 If this is the benefit for which the bidders were competing, it is
difficult to see how the competitiveness of the bidding establishes the
economic reality necessary to buttress the nominal ownership. If mere
bidding for a non-assignable depreciation deduction creates economic
reality, one wonders why the Court said "sham" in Knetsch. 7
Although the competitive bidding is perhaps the most perverse of
the factors specified by the Court, the other factors are hardly more
compelling. In distinguishing prior sale-leaseback cases, the Court
accepted Lyon's notion that a three-party transaction is inherently
different from a two-party transaction. Although the numbers are
different absolutely, the significance of this difference is beyond grasp.
If Lyon had had available cash of $7,640,000, not just $500,000, it
could have invested the full building cost without the intervention of
New York Life. Would that have made the case a harder one for Lyon?
The Court seems to say so.
Or suppose New York Life, desiring the depreciation deductions,
had purchased the building and leased it back to Worthen. Would it
fail to qualify as owner under the Frank Lyon rationale just because it
had not brought another financing party into the transaction to make
three? Again, the Court seems to say so. 78  This aspect of the Court's
" Appendix, supra note 7, vol. 1, at 54 (testimony of Lyon officer); see Frank Lyon Co. v.
United States, 536 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 561 (1978). But see Fuller,
Saes and Leasebacks and the Frank Lyon Case, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 60, 75 n.132 (1979). After
accounting for the tax on Lyon's potential capital gain, when the building would be resold to
Worthen after 11 years, the government computed the net tax saving to Lyon as $615,000, not
$1,500,000 (Appendix, supra note 7, vol. 2, at 696 (D.Ex.6)), and the cash flow after tax as
$650,000 (id. at 692 (D.Ex.2)).
76 See E. GRISWOLD AND M. GRAETz, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 335-38, 1045-51, esp.
1049, Note (A) (1976).
' In Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960), the Court disallowed a claimed
interest deduction, calling the alleged indebtedness which underlay the claim a "sham"
because the transaction, legally valid under state law, would not likely have been entered
absent the anticipated federal income tax benefits. Would Frank Lyon Company or any of the
other bidders have had any interest in the Worthen proposal or the bank building without the
anticipated tax benefits?
7 See, e.g., 435 U.S. at 576.
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opinion does nothing but signal tax lawyers that clients seeking tax
shelter should never travel in pairs.
It is also disturbing that the Court found support for its decision
in the presumed absence of any potential revenue loss in this case.
The Court seemed to believe that the government's loss in tax from
Lyon would be equal to the revenue gained from Worthen. That
factor, if true, might cause an observer to wonder why the govern-
ment would bother to litigate this particular case. Would the govern-
ment with nothing immediately at stake press a case like this only to
establish a precedent for cases in which there was a tax differential, or
just to establish a principle? Perhaps. For surely one would not expect
the Court to enunciate a rule applicable only to pairs of taxpayers in
the same tax bracket. Some tax benefits are freely allocable by the
parties to a transaction,79 while most, like depreciation deductions,
are not. But none are allocable by the parties only in the absence of a
significant tax differential. Presumably, then, the precedent of Frank
Lyon binds all taxpayers, and tax planners will structure transactions
in the form approved by Frank Lyon. In many of these cases, the
government will have a great deal at stake. The Court, therefore,
should not have allowed its perception of factors peculiar to Lyon to
influence it when formulating a principle for future cases in which
these factors would not be involved.
As a final illustration of the difficulties with the Court's litany of
factors, let us consider the rivalry between Worthen and its local bank
competitor and the reasonableness of the prices and rentals. Certainly
these factors were present in the case; yet it is difficult to see how they
bear on ownership. Surely, Worthen would not be considered owner
just because it was the only or most successful bank in town. Nor does
the reasonableness of rental payments prevent their characterization
as loan repayments. The list of factors recited by the Court seems only
to describe the evidence adduced in this case; it does not elucidate a
rationale for the holding.
Almost entirely absent from the Court's litany are those factors
that go to a comparison of the risk and benefit possibilities that
distinguished Worthen from Lyon, or, more generally, to the charac-
teristics that distinguish the investment of an owner from that of a
lender. This distinction should have been the focus of the Court's
analysis.
" Consider, for example, alimony payments. I.R.C. §§ 71, 215; see Commissioner v.
Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961). Consider also the investment tax credit. I.R.C. §§ 38, 46-48, esp.
§ 48(d). In August 1981 Congress enacted new, liberal rules for the allocation of depreciation
deductions in connection with leases of "qualified leased property" entered into after Decem-
ber 31, 1980. I.R.C. § 168(0(8). "Qualified leased property" does not include buildings.
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In theory, a taxpayer may deduct the amount of his investment
by way of annual depreciation deductions taken over the life of the
investment, but only if the investment has a limited and estimable
useful life, one whose value can be expected to decrease over time. An
investment in land or in the capital stock of a corporation, unlike one
in machinery or a factory, is not depreciable. When a businessman
borrows $10,000 from a bank and purchases a $10,000 machine for
use in his business, he may depreciate his investment over the ex-
pected life of the machine on a straight-line or accelerated basis.
Although his funds come from the bank, the depreciable investment is
treated as his because he must repay the loan in full even though in
time the machine will be worthless. The bank, however, recovers its
capital tax-free only as the principal of its investment, the loan, is
repaid. Its amortization is typically decelerated, with substantial inter-
est income up-front. The borrower gets a compensating interest de-
duction up-front. Lenders, in effect, amortize their loans for tax
purposes on a sinking fund theory of capital recovery, one that com-
ports with economic reality. 80 The taxable income of a lender is
therefore grossly distorted if he is treated as an owner for purposes of
the depreciation deduction.
Who, Worthen or Lyon, is more like the owner of a depreciable
asset, and who is more like a financing party? The Eighth Circuit,
although it may have been inaccurate in characterizing Lyon's posi-
tion as completely free from risk,8 quite properly attempted to answer
this question by examining the property rights held by each party to
the transaction. Was it not correct to credit the importance of
Worthen's right to the appreciation on the investment? Lyon was
virtually assured of recovering its investment and six percent interest,
subject only to the risk of Worthen's insolvency, the same risk that
every lender assumes, or to the wholly improbable possibility that (1)
Worthen would not exercise its purchase option, (2) Worthen would
not renew the lease,8 2 and (3) Lyon would be left with a building
worth less than $500,000.83 The only ownership-type risk that Lyon
might be said to have borne was that a $7,640,000 building might
drop in value to less than $500,000 plus interest. 84  In analyzing
whether such a risk warrants the tax consequences of ownership,
80 See M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 135 (2d ed. 1979).
81 536 F.2d at 752-53.
82 It is true, of course, that the lease renewals would not assure a full six percent return.
83 435 U.S. at 586 n.4.
8 Acknowledged lenders take the same kind of risk, particularly when they grant nonre-
course mortgage loans.
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Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion is illuminating. 85 He observed
that Worthen bore the risk of any economic depreciation to the extent
of the difference between the value of the building and Lyon's guaran-
teed return, for that decrease in value would render the exercise of the
purchase option less profitable.8 Similarly, although not remarked
in Justice Stevens's opinion, that first increment of depreciation
would render the lease renewal options less profitable if the taxpayer's
prediction proved correct and Worthen chose to exercise those options
rather than the repurchase option. The price set in the repurchase
option assured Lyon a return of its investment with six percent inter-
est. Justice Stevens therefore viewed Worthen as the owner with an
option to "put" the building to Lyon if it dropped in value below
$500,000 plus interest.8 7 Should Worthen choose not to exercise the
repurchase option, effectively it would be exercising its put, and
"perhaps it would then be appropriate to characterize [Lyon] as the
owner and Worthen as the lessee." 88 Justice Stevens reasoned, how-
ever, that speculation as to events twenty-five years hence should not
affect current depreciation deductions.
The economics of the transaction determined that Worthen suffer
the burden of any initial decline in value and, if Worthen failed to
exercise its options, Lyon would bear the more remote and highly
contingent subsequent declines. The tax consequences should follow
the economics as long as there is adherence to the principle that the
depreciation deduction is for the taxpayer who suffers the economic
risk of a decline in value of the investment. According to this princi-
ple, Worthen would be entitled to the depreciation deductions unless
and until the risk shifted, until Worthen actually "put" the building
to Lyon.
III
WHAT WENT WRONG?
The Court's opinion in Frank Lyon simply fails to deal adequately
with the problem presented. Its analysis reflects a limited understand-
ing of the issues, and part of the blame for this rests squarely with the
Court. But the adversary system presumes that the parties to a contro-
85 See 435 U.S. at 584-88.
8' Id. at 586 n.4.
s Id. at 587 n.7.
8 Id. at 587.
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versy will take initial responsibility for helping the Court comprehend
and analyze the issues it is being asked to resolve. In Lyon, the parties
failed to discharge this responsibility.
From the beginning, the government mismanaged the case. Rev-
enue agents operating under common supervision in the same office
undertook audits of Lyon and Worthen.8" They were consistent in
that Worthen was denied the rental deduction and given interest and
depreciation deductions, while Lyon's interest and depreciation de-
ductions were disallowed and the rental income was excluded.9 ° At
this point, however, the agents parted ways. The agent handling the
Worthen audit set up a depreciation schedule based on a forty-five
year composite life for the facility." Lyon, on the other hand, had
depreciated elements of the building separately, based on lives rang-
ing from fifteen to forty years. During the Lyon audit, the govern-
ment disallowed depreciation altogether but never challenged the
rates. This failure meant that once Lyon prevailed in court on its right
to a depreciation deduction, the government probably was foreclosed
from thereafter challenging the rate of depreciation.92 In spite of an
initial determination by the only agent who considered the issue that
forty-five years reflected the proper life, Lyon has continued to use
shorter lives and has never had to defend its estimates.
A second shortcoming in the government's conduct of the case
has had even more serious repercussions. The agents challenged
Lyon's depreciation and interest deductions for the month of Decem-
ber 1969, and, at the same time, allowed such deductions to Worthen,
one month's depreciation in 1969 and the balance in 1970, increasing
its net operating loss for that year by $141,000. The government did
not hold Worthen's returns in suspense pending resolution of the Lyon
case. 93 As a result, during the course of the Lyon litigation, the statute
of limitations ran against the government's right to reverse its grant of
depreciation and interest deductions to Worthen. The net result was
" See Letter from Lyon's trial counsel, J. Gaston Williamson, to Bernard Wolfman (July 6,
1978) (on file at Cornell Law Rejiew).
90 Id.
91 Id.
0 Res judicata doctrine probably precludes the government from now challenging the rate
of depreciation because it could have challenged the rate during the Lyon litigation but did not
do so. Seegenerally Letter from Lyon's trial counsel, J. Gaston Williamson, to Bernard Wolfman
(July 18, 1978) (on file at Cornell Law Review).
93 The IRS could have deferred crediting Worthen's 1967 income with the 1970 net
operating loss until Frank Lyon was decided, and it could have awaited final resolution of Lyon
before reducing Worthen's 1969 income by $20,297.81 (depreciation for December 1969). See
Letter from J. Gaston Williamson to Bernard Wolfman (November 3, 1981) (on file at Cornell
Law Review).
1981] 1091
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
that in a case in which taxpayer's counsel *advised the Court that no
deductions were "created," 9 4 two taxpayers were irrevocably granted
depreciation deductions with respect to the same property for 1969
and 1970.
The irony of the double deduction becomes more poignant and
less tolerable on review of the transcript of oral argument before the
Court. The Worthen returns and revenue agent reports were not part
of the trial record. The Court was therefore unaware that Worthen
had been given the depreciation deduction. 95 During questioning
from the Bench, however, one of the Justices sought and received
assurance from the Assistant Solicitor General that, if the government
were to prevail against Lyon, Worthen would receive the benefit of
the disputed deductions, and that the statute of limitations would not
be a bar to Worthen's claim.9 Neither government counsel nor
taxpayer counsel disclosed that a victory for Lyon would assure a
double deduction, $20,300 in 1969 and $141,000 in 1970, for both
Lyon and Worthen.
The double deduction was, of course, irrelevant to the substan-
tive question in Frank Lyon, and clearly the government should not be
able to rely on its failure to protect its claim against Worthen to
support its case against Lyon. What is most notable is the inadequacy
of the government's advocacy. Government counsel seemed to be
unaware of the double deduction prospect, and he made no effort to
explain to the concerned Justice that Worthen's failure to file a pro-
tective claim for refund or the government's failure to hold the
Worthen return in suspense were entirely irrelevant to the question
whether Lyon was entitled to depreciation deductions. Counsel for
Lyon did not clarify this point. No one disclosed to the Court that the
Justice's worry was for naught because Worthen had already been
given the deductions in question, and that it was only the government
that could lose on this score.
But this is getting ahead of the story, for between the time of the
IRS audit and the Court's decision, the process failed at another
critical point-the grant of certiorari. Lyon's petition for certiorari
alleged a conflict with two cases in other circuits, 9 and the Court
based its grant of the writ on an "indicated conflict" with one of these
cases, the Fourth Circuit's decision in American Realty Trust v. United
States.98 American Realty Trust involved a sale-leaseback, and, unlike
14 Petition for Certiorari at 10-11.
" Transcript of oral argument at 24-25; Appendix, supra note 7, vol. 1, at 201-02.
"' Transcript of oral argument at 24-25.
17 Petition for Certiorari at 8-9.
98 498 F.2d 1194 (4th Cir. 1974); see 435 U.S. at 572.
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Lyon, the owner-lessor won its appeal in the circuit court. Thisalone
would not imply a conflict, however, for as Lyon's counsel noted, "all
cases in this area have their own facts, and so any decision may be
distinguished on one ground or another." 99 The gravamen of Lyon's
petition was that the approaches of the Fourth and Eighth Circuits were
inconsistent. Review would have been appropriate if the tensions in
Frank Lyon were akin to those in American Realty Trust, but they were
not. A fact in American Realty Trust that was absent in Frank Lyon-one
that could be present in only a handful of special cases-foretold the
result in the Fourth Circuit.
In opposition to certiorari, the government pointed to some dif-
ferences in the facts underlying the two transactions.100 In American
Realty Trust, for instance, the rental payments were not equal to the
required mortgage payments, 101 condemnation proceeds were divided
between landlord and tenant, and the tenant, unlike Worthen, could
cancel its lease obligation before the mortgage was satisfied. Perhaps
distinctions such as these should not have been persuasive, although it
is a bit surprising that they were not, in light of the Court's general
reluctance to review civil tax cases absent the clearest of pressing
conflicts. But there is another distinction that makes American Realty
Trust quite special-a distinction that the government did not bring to
the attention of the Court. The depreciation deductions claimed in
American Realty Trust and disallowed by the government amounted to
only $19,000. Yet the deficiency in corporate income tax resulting
from this disallowance totaled almost $280,000. The taxpayer was not
an ordinary business corporation; it was a real estate investment trust
not subject to corporate tax on its distributed income if it distributed
ninety percent or more of its net income as dividends to its share-
holders.10 2 Having distributed dividends equal to ninety percent of
its reported net income, the taxpayer paid no corporate tax. With the
disallowance of its depreciation deduction, however, its net income
was retroactively increased by $19,000. Because less than ninety per-
cent of its recalculated net income had been distributed, the trust was
now taxable on all of its income, both the distributed and the undis-
tributed, leaving a tax liability of nearly $280,000 even though most of
the taxpayer's income had already been distributed to its shareholders
as dividends taxable to them. This case arose under a section of the
99 Petition for Certiorari at 10.
100 See Brief for the United States in Opposition at 10-12; Brief for the United States at
68-70.
101 Brief for the United States in Opposition at 11.
102 See I.R.C. § 857(a)(1); American Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F.2d 1194, 1195
nn.2-4 (1974).
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Code that has since been amended to provide less harsh treatment for
real estate investment trusts that have attempted to distribute at least
ninety percent of their income; moreover, the amendment was before
Congress when the Fourth Circuit considered the case.10 3 But be-
cause the former provision applied to this taxpayer, it is not surprising
that the Fourth Circuit struggled mightily to allow the depreciation
deduction that the taxpayer had computed and claimed in good faith.
With the facts indicating that some of the property appreciation could
accrue to the benefit of the buyer-lessor, and with the seller-lessee not
bound absolutely to the lease and thus to the long-term loan, the
Fourth Circuit found it possible to treat the taxpayer as owner. The
Fourth Circuit was determined to relieve the "plight" 104 in which the
taxpayer found itself in American Realty Trust. Government counsel in
Frank Lyon never called attention to this crucial aspect of American
Realty Trust in opposing certiorari, and the Court did not find it on its
own.
The poor substantive result in Frank Lyon presents a strong argu-
ment for hesitance on the part of the Court to grant certiorari in a civil
tax case unless it is certain that a square conflict divides the circuits.
Only then is there -a clear need for unifying resolution by the Court,
and it will have had the benefit of full deliberation given the same
issue by two circuits. The chances of irrelevant or unworthy consider-
ations surviving the scrutiny of two circuit courts and the Supreme
Court are certainly diminished; the very existence of a real conflict
suggests that one of the courts may have noted the irrelevancy. The
theory works, of course, only if the cases alleged to conflict present the
same issue. This simply was not the situation in Frank Lyon, a case
mishandled by the government from the beginning and one that the
Court probably should not have taken. And while before the Court on
the merits, this benighted case suffered yet another failure of process.
Taxpayer's counsel repeatedly asserted to the Court, without
challenge by the government, that Worthen and Lyon were "subject
to identical tax rates," 10 5 that there was "no differential in tax
rate," 106 ''no effort to take advantage of a tax differential," 107 and no
"special tax circumstance." 108 On the basis of such assertions, the
103 498 F.2d at 1195 n.4. See I.R.C. § 859.
'0 498 F.2d at 1195 n.4.
'0 Petition for Certiorari at 10 n.7; Brief for the Petitioner at 17 n.8.
106 Brief for the Petitioner at 17. See also Transcript of oral argument at 21 ("There is no
need to take the [interest] deduction away from Lyon in order to protect the revenue.").
107 Petition for Certiorari at 10 n.7; Brief for the Petitioner at 17 n.8.
... Brief for the Petitioner at 17.
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Court concluded that there was no net revenue at stake.' 0 9 The
record does show that, for Lyon, the deductions offset income taxable
at forty-eight percent, n1 but it contained no information as to
Worthen's tax returns or bracket. As it turned out, Worthen was also
able to use the depreciation deductions of 1969 and 1970 to offset
income taxable at forty-eight percent, but Worthen was a taxpayer in
a very "special tax circumstance," one whose marginal tax bracket
comes close to being elective.
In 1970, the first full year for which it would have been entitled to
interest and depreciation deductions, Worthen was not subject to
federal income tax because it had no taxable income."' The deduc-
tions foisted on it by the government increased a 1970 net operating
loss by $141,000, one that Worthen carried back as a deduction
against its 1967 income. Accordingly, the government reduced a tax
deficiency proposed against Worthen that arose from unrelated is-
sues." ' Although the 1970 deductions would offset income taxable to
both Lyon and Worthen at forty-eight percent, in challenging the tax
effect of the Worthen-Lyon arrangement the government was not as
academic as Lyon's Supreme Court counsel had the court believe." 3
One might say that Worthen and Lyon were in the same tax
circumstances because both corporations were subject to the same
schedule of tax rates under Section 11 of the Internal Revenue Code.
But that would be misleading. Worthen was in a "special tax circum-
stance" because it was a commercial bank." 4 Commercial banks
109 435 U.S. at 550 n.15.
110 Appendix, supra note 7, vol. 2, at 589.
" See Letters from Lyon's trial counsel, J. Gaston Williamson, to Bernard Wolfman (July
6, 1978, October 19, 1981, and November 2, 1981) (on file at Cornell Law Review).
112 Id. See note 122 infra.
13 See Letters from Lyon's Supreme Court counsel, Erwin N. Griswold, to Bernard Wolf-
man (September 25, 1978 and September 30, 1981), and from Lyon's trial counsel, J. Gaston
Williamson, to Bernard Wolfman (October 19, 1981 and November 3, 1981) (on file at Cornell
Law Review).
Government counsel did nothing to relieve the impression of a mere academic exercise
created by Lyon's oral and written presentations. He just urged the Court not to be concerned
with the absence of a tax differential in Lyon since future cases might involve net deficiencies in
tax. See Brief for the United States in Opposition at 10 n. 10; Brief for the United States at
64-65. Stuart A. Smith, the Assistant Solicitor General principally responsible for the Govern-
ment's brief on the merits, presented the Government's oral argument. See notes 116-22 infra.
114 Commercial banks have been a mainstay in the tax-exempt bond market. See Note, The
Municipal Bond Market: An Analysis and Suggested Reforn, 16 HARv. J. LEGIs. 211 (1979). Al-
though individual investors replaced commercial banks as the largest group of tax-exempt
bondholders during the 1950s, commercial banks reestablished their dominance during the
1960s. Id. at 221. During the first half of the 1970s, commercial banks held approximately
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comprise the only class of taxpayers permitted to deduct the interest
expenses incurred in holding state and local bonds that yield tax-ex-
empt interest income.' 15 Studies show that, as a class, commercial
banks pay an effective rate of federal income tax of only nine percent,
largely because of their substantial holdings of tax-exempt bonds. 116 It
is, of course, true that by itself the average effective income tax rate of
commercial banks tells us nothing specific about their marginal rate of
tax. It does not explain why commercial banks would not need accel-
erated depreciation deductions to offset income taxable at forty-eight
percent, or why they would put such deductions up for bid to tax-
payers like Lyon or to the clients of Goldman, Sachs. The explanation
lies in the fact that within limits commercial banks like Worthen can
predict their taxable income, and they can alter it by shifting their mix
of taxable and tax-exempt investments, while Lyon and other ordi-
nary business corporations are less free to do so. Commercial banks
can keep their taxable income below the level at which the maximum
statutory rate (forty-eight percent at the time of the Lyon-Worthen
transaction) becomes applicable by carefully managing their invest-
ment portfolios. After seeing a draft of this article, the attorney for
Worthen and Lyon put the matter thus:
You are of course correct in stating in your article that com-
mercial banks can alter their taxable income by shifting their mix
of taxable and nontaxable investments .... Worthen Bank has
always sought to be taxed in the maximum tax bracket .... As
the record in Lyon demonstrated, Worthen Bank initially planned
to own the building .... You may be sure that had Worthen Bank
owned the building, it would have varied its investment mix to
ensure that the resulting interest and depreciation deductions
would have been against income otherwise taxable at 48 %. Any-
thing else would have been considered a waste of the deductions. 1 17
one-half of all outstanding state and local government bonds. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, December 1977. See also
H.R. REP. No. 1016, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1976).
115 See I.R.C. § 265(2); Rev. Rul. 70-10, 1970-2 C.B. 499; Rev. Proc. 72-18, 1972-1 C.B.
740; Rev. Proc. 81-16, 1981-17 I.R.B. 33, revoking Rev. Proc. 80-55, 1980-2 C.B. 849. Cf.
Rev. Rul. 81-200, 1981-33 I.R.B. 5.
n" Because they hold large amounts of tax-exempt bonds, commercial banks enjoy an
effective tax rate far below the statutory corporate tax rate. For the 20 largest commercial
banks, the effective United States tax rate on worldwide income (using a weighted industry
average) was 3% and 9.3% in 1979 and 1978 respectively. Further, only one of the 20 largest
banks had an effective United States tax rate on worldwide income as high as 18% in 1979 or
22% in 1978. See TAx NOTES, July 7, 1980, at 39, and February 18, 1980, at 235.
117 See Letter fromJ. Gaston Williamson to Bernard Wolfman (October 19, 1981) (on file at
Cornell Law Review).
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There is no explanation given for Worthen's voluntary decision
"to be taxed in the maximum tax bracket." It may be an expression
of noblesse oblige, because as a commercial bank Worthen is in an elite
tax circumstance that enables it to maintain an extraordinarily low
effective rate of federal income tax. Or perhaps, like tax-exempt
universities that make payments "in lieu of taxes" in order to fend off
a political onslaught from the mass of taxable property owners, a
commercial bank like Worthen elects to fly a forty-eight percent flag
just high enough not to be noticed as special.
Although the yield on tax-exempt bonds is less than that on
corporate bonds, the sacrifice in the investment return (the "implicit
tax") is typically less than the federal income tax saVings. In 1968, for
example, when Worthen and Lyon were negotiating, a corporation
with income taxable at forty-eight percent would be indifferent to the
status (whether tax-exempt or taxable) of the interest paid on two
otherwise equivalent bonds as long as the yield on the tax-exempt
bond was fifty-two percent of the yield on the taxable bond. The
"implicit tax" of forty-eight percent would exactly equal the federal
income tax. But in 1968 tax-exempt municipal bond yields were
almost eighty percent of corporate bond yields, reducing the "implicit
tax" on federaly tax-exempt interest to only twenty percent.118 The
question, then, is why in such circumstances all highly profitable
corporate taxpayers (like Lyon) do not find municipal bonds the
obvious shelter to limit the amount of their income taxable at rates
above that of the "implicit tax." There are two main reasons: One is
that investment in marketable securities makes ordinary business cor-
porations prey to a penalty tax on "unreasonable accumulations" of
income under section 531 (as Lyon already was).11 9 Second, ordinary
business corporations are subject to significant constraints under sec-
tion 265(2), and commercial banks are not. 12 0  Since commercial
banks can deduct from their gross taxable income the interest they pay
on borrowed funds used to purchase or maintain municipals, they
can, if they wish, keep their net taxable income below the "surtax
exemption" limit (the erstwhile term used to designate the income
level above which the maximum statutory tax rate is applicable).
Indeed, a commercial bank that might have more taxable income than
it wants above the surtax exemption limit (or income above the
116 See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, esp. Chart 1, (1976). It shows that
from 1947 to 1975 the ratio of municipal to corporate bond yields varied from a low of 63% to a
high of 80%. Short term municipal debt, however, purchased almost exclusively by commer-
cial banks, tended to yield a return equal to (just above) the reciprocal of the maximum
statutory corporate tax rate, i.e., 52% when the tax iate was 48%. Id. at 10.
1"9 See, e.g., Treas. Reg..1.533-1(a)(2)(ii).
"0 See note 115 supra.
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"implicit tax" rate on municipals, its "effective marginal rate")' 2 '
would be free to sell deductions like accelerated depreciation to shel-
ter-seeking taxpayers like Lyon, this because the bank could borrow
funds to generate an interest expense sufficient to offset the income
that otherwise would be taxed at the maximum statutory rate. The
fact is that Worthen and Lyon were very different kinds of taxpayers
in very different circumstances. It is not credible that Worthen and
Lyon, while sharing the same tax lawyer, with both Mr. Lyon and the
lawyer sitting on the Worthen board, were unaware of their differing
tax needs and the way each might be helpful to the other at the
expense of only the United States Treasury.
122
None of this, of course, should have made the slightest difference
to the Court. If Lyon is entitled to depreciate the building, it is
entitled to do so regardless of how valuable the depreciation deduction
is to it and how relatively unimportant it is to Worthen. But if the
Court believed that the absence of a special tax circumstance mat-
tered, it should have remanded for findings on the issue, or dismissed
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, or required Lyon's
counsel to support his assertion that neither party to the Worthen-
Lyon transaction was in a special tax circumstance. Government
counsel failed in not challenging the assertion and not explaining to
the Court that commercial banks have a special, if not unique, tax
status. Although the assumed absence of a special tax circumstance
should not have been important to the Court in reaching its decision,
the Court, as good advocates know, better appreciates the tension
between tax collector and taxpayer when one exists. 12 3
121 By "effective marginal rate" I mean the lower of the rate of "implicit tax" or the highest
rate of federal income tax applicable to a taxpayer's taxable income. I am indebted to my
colleague, William D. Andrews, for the term "effective marginal rate."
12 During the period in question, Worthen enjoyed an "effective marginal tax rate" well
below the maximum statutory rate of 48 %, although it chose to pay federal tax on some of its
income at 48%. See Letters from Lyon's counsel, J. Gaston Williamson, to Bernard Wolfman
(July 6, 1978, October 19, 1981, and November 2, 1981) (on file at Cornell Law Review). See also
note 113 supra,
Public records show that First Arkansas Bankstock Corporation, which acquired 99% of
Worthen's stock in 1969, had an average effective tax rate of only 11% during the period
1971-1975 inclusive. See ANNUAL REPORT OF FIRST ARKANSAS BANKSTOCK CORPORATION TO
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 28 (1975). It is clear from the Report that Worthen's
holdings of municipal bonds were primarily responsible for Worthen's low rate of federal
income tax throughout the period. Although the precise data are not available for each year, it
appears that Worthen, like other commercial banks, generally was able to determine how
much, if any, of its income was to be taxed at 48%, the rate at which the bulk of Lyon's income
was taxed.
' It is apparent from the Court's opinion in Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 561 n.18 , that it
accepted the government's successful reallocation of the depreciation deduction in Sun Oil Co.
v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978), largely
because it knew that one of the parties involved in that sale-leaseback was tax-exempt. What if
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At trial, government counsel should have made it clear to the
district court that this controversy involved the allocation of deduc-
tions between a taxpayer unlikely to be subject to much tax at high
marginal rates, except at its pleasure, and a taxpayer with so much
taxable income that it feared imposition of a section 531 penalty. Only
with that type of record could the government be confident that the
courts would not view the question as largely academic, one for which
it was not worth upsetting businessmen's expectations.
IV
THE FUTURE OF Frank Lyon AND THE ADVERSARY PROCESS
The full scope of Frank Lyon is unclear. 124  The Court concluded
its opinion on a relatively broad note, stating:
[W]e hold that where . .. there is a genuine multiple-party trans-
action with economic substance which is compelled or encouraged
by business or regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-independent
considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features
... [the lessor retains significant and genuine attributes of the
traditional lessor status,] the form of the transaction adopted by the
parties governs for tax purposes. 25
But the Court also relied on twenty-six factors peculiar to this transac-
tion, leading one commentator to observe, "[D]espite [Lyon's] favor-
able outcome for the taxpayer, it may actually only benefit the Com-
missioner, who will be able to show that few, if any, future cases are
ones where all the Lyon factors are present." 126
Frank Lyon did not have to happen. The elucidation of principle
in tax cases should not depend on irrelevant or legalistic distinctions.
A Supreme Court opinion ought not become the basis for tax lawyers
to make a laughingstock of the Court as they now do when quite
routinely they add unnecessary third parties to financing transactions
the Court had known that Worthen, like all commercial banks, was in a very special tax
circumstance?
124 See Fuller, Sales and Leasebacks and the Frank Lyon Case, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REy. 60 (1979).
123 435 U.S. at 583-84.
12 Zarrow &" Gordon, Supreme Court's Sale-Leaseback Decision in Lyon Lists Multiple Criteria, 49
J. TAx. 42, 47 (1978). In Davis v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 807, 814-15 (6th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979), the court compared the facts in the case before it with those present
in Lyon; in Belz Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1209, 1226 (1979), the court stated, "[I]t
is difficult to pinpoint a general legal proposition for which [Lyon] stands." But cf. Hilton v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305, 346 (1980) ("[I]mplicit in the [Lyon] Court's opinion is the
acceptance of the proposition . . . that the seller-lessee's financing requirements may be a valid
business purpose to support a sale-leaseback transaction for tax purposes.").
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in order to qualify for the shelter of Frank Lyon.127 Until the time
comes when the Court can undo the mischief of Frank Lyon, one hopes
that the Service and lower courts will see it as a case whose preceden-
tial significance is impaired substantially by the flawed process from
which it emerged.
It is too much, if not wrong, to expect the Court to develop an
enduring and sophisticated tax jurisprudence. In an environment of
infinitely diverse and complex transactions governed by an arcane
Code, the Court cannot devote the time necessary to become expert..
Except in the most unusual circumstances, therefore, it is necessary
for the Court to protect itself from cases that have not produced
sharply conflicting decisions below. The Court should satisfy itself
that an asserted conflict is real and not just rhetorical or superficial,
that the tensions in the allegedly conflicting cases are the same.128
The Court in this instance should have seen the difference between
American Realty Trust and Frank Lyon on its own, even without the
wonted help of the Solicitor General. The Court, moreover, has a
duty to ascertain whether it is actually deciding the case it thinks it is.
If relevant facts are not evident from the record, the Court should
either remand the case or dismiss the writ of certiorari. The Court
must exercise such restraint if the process is to function and if its
decisions are to be accepted as precedents worthy of respect and
deference.
Nor is it too much to ask that counsel help the Court. The
Solicitor General's role is special in this respect because the Court has
long looked to him for assurance that the analysis is complete, the
research exhaustive, and the shoddy and irrelevant exposed. More-
over, the Court has a right to expect that all counsel will look critically
at the contentions and assertions of their adversaries and that none
127 See Fuller, Sales and Leasebaks and the Frank Lyon Case, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 60, 81
(1979) (recommending that tax lawyers always include third parties in sale-leasebacks, without
suggesting any function for third parties, and citing Frank Lyon).
128 In Singleton v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 940 (1978), Justice Blackmun, dissenting from
the Court's denial of certiorari, urged quite reasonably that even in the absence of a conflict
below, review of a tax case is justifiable when the issue has "importance in the administration
of the tax laws" as long as it is not "too fact-specific or incapable of precedential effect."
Justice Stevens, also quite reasonably, supported the Court's denial of the writ, stating that
"the absence of any conflict among the Circuits is plainly a sufficient reason for denying
certiorari." It is ironic that in Frank Lyon, where the Court assumed a square conflict below, it
decides the case in a way that confounds administration of the tax law by emphasizing 26
fact-specific criteria as its ground for decision.
There can be cases in the absence of an asserted conflict that will justify Supreme Court
review on the conditions Justice Blackmun indicated. See, e.g., United States v. Cannelton
Sewer Pipe Co., 364 U.S. 76 (1960). But those conditions may be more apparent than real,
and as Frank Lyon indicates, even when conflicts are asserted there may be more illusion than
reality.
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will ever make assertions that lack a basis in the record. Such an
environment and a diligent Court is needed if we are to shed some of
our skepticism about the integrity of the adversary process, allay our
suspicion that the case as described by the Court may be partially
hypothetical, and come to respect the decisions of the Court as worthy
precedent. The Court and its Bar must bring us to believe that the
process that produces the ultimate interpretation of federal law is
dependable and whole.
ADDENDUM
The author has learned that early in 1981 Worthen repurchased
the bank building from Lyon in exchange for cash of $500,000 and
Worthen's seven percent cumulative preferred stock of an aggregate
par value of $14,000,000 and that twenty years hence Lyon can put
the stock to Worthen for cash redemption at par plus accrued divi-
dends. 12 9
Under the terms of the Worthen-Lyon sale-leaseback, Worthen
was granted an option to repurchase the building first exercisable after
the eleventh year of the lease, on November 30, 1980, at a price of
$6,325,169.85 (the amount of the unpaid New York Life note plus
Lyon's $500,000 "equity" with six percent compound interest). 130
For the first eleven years of the lease, Lyon's depreciation and
interest deductions exceeded its rental income, providing substantial
shelter for its other income. 131 Thereafter, beginning in 1981, if it
remained the "owner" Lyon's rental income from Worthen would
exceed the deductions, producing taxable income. 132
129 See Letter fromJ. Gaston Williamson to Bernard Wolfman (October 19, 1981) (on file at
Cornell Law Review). If Worthen chooses, it may pay for its preferred stock upon redemption in
20 years with $14,000,000 worth of the stock of its parent holding company, First Arkansas
Bankstock Corporation. Lyon will pay off the outstanding balance on the New York Life note
in accordance with its orginal terms. See Letter from Bernard Wolfman to J. Gaston William-
son (November 16, 1981) (on file at Cornell Law Review).
"' Appendix, supra note 7, vol. 1, at 303 (district court finding of fact). See note 16 and
accompanying text supra. A 20 year bond with a face value of $14,000,000, paying semi-annual
interest of 7 % and discounted to yield an annual return of 17.691%, would have a present value
of approximately $5,825,170. That sum, plus the $500,000 cash payment, equals the option
price. A discount rate of 17.69% apears reasonable for early 1981. According to the attorney
for Worthen and Lyon, "Because of Worthen's need to increase its capital, this was a better
buy for Worthen than exercising its option on November 30, 1980 to purchase the building for
$6,325,170 in cash." Letter from J. Gaston Williamson to Bernard Wolfman (October 19,
1981) (on file at Cornell Law Review). As the government foresaw from the beginning, as the
Eighth Circuit and the dissenting Justices would understand, Lyon has received only the
repayment of its $500,000 with interest at six percent.
131 Appendix, supra note 7, vol. 2, at 595 (P.Ex.36); notes 75-76 and accompanying text
supra.
132 Id.
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The Government had projected the repurchase as an almost
inevitable event. It urged this strong probability as an important
reason for treating Worthen as owner of the building from the begin-
ning. But Lyon persuaded the district court to find:
Because of Worthen's future capital requirements, the very sub-
stantial amounts of the option prices, the reasonableness of the net
rents Worthen will be required to pay. . . , it is most unlikely that
Worthen will exercise its options to purchase at the end of the first
eleven years of the lease .... 133
The Supreme Court said that it could not "indulge in . . . specula-
tion" to the contrary in light of this "clear finding." 
34
133 Appendix, supra note 7, vol. 1, at 304 (district court finding of fact).
134 435 U.S. at 581. For an outcome very different from that in Frank Lyon, in another
context, see A Gnat Challenges a Lyon in L'Estrange, FABLES OF AESOP 13 (Harrison of Paris ed.
1931).
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